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The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of recent research on the role of patent systems in 
the early phases of industrialization. Perhaps surprisingly, no consensus has been reached yet as to 
whether the emergence of modern patent systems exerted a favourable impact on inventive 
activities. However, the recent literature has shed light on a number of fundamental factors which 
affect the links between inventive activities and the patent system. The concluding section of the 
paper outlines some "history lessons" for the current debate on the role of Intellectual Property 
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1. Introduction  
Over the last two decades, intellectual property rights (IPR) have become a subject of 
growing discussion and debate both in industrialized and in developing countries.  One of 
the chief reasons for this increasing attention has been without doubt the shift towards a 
strengthening of IPR regimes which has taken place in the global economy since the early 
1980s. In fact, in the course of the 1960s and 1970s many developing countries were 
capable of withstanding political pressures for the implementation of stricter IPR 
regimes. However, with the early 1980s, IPR issues were more and more often raised by 
the US in the context of bilateral trade negotiations. This strategy of the US governments 
was essentially motivated by concerns over the deteriorating competitiveness of 
American industry, especially vis a vis, the newly industrializing countries. One of the 
culprits for this deterioration was identified in the imitation and reverse engineering of 
US products taking place in these economies. Hence, the campaign for the 
implementation of stronger IPR regimes (David, 1993, pp. 19-20, Scherer, 2006 and 
Granstrand, 2005, pp. 273-278).
1 Progressively, stronger IPR protection was included in 
the broad "package" of institutional reforms, which advanced industrial economies and 
international development organizations imposed on developing countries (Chang, 2002).  
 
The TRIPS agreement can be regarded as a further stage in this process. Advanced 
industrial economies have insisted on the introduction of IPR issues within the 
framework of the WTO negotiations. The consequence is that failure to comply with the 
stricter standards of IPR protection defined in the agreements may result in trade 
retaliatory measures. Clearly, this amounts to a growing pressure towards stronger IPR 
regimes worldwide. As summarized, in the 1999 World Bank Report: “Stronger IPRs are 
a permanent feature of the new global economy” (World Bank, 1998, p. 36).  
 
It should be noted that IPRs (and patent systems in particular) are especially tricky issues 
for industrial organization theory. This is due to the fact that many policy implications 
concerning the optimal design of a patent system (which in the literature are typically 
                                                 
1 In his appraisal of the long-term, historical evolution of IPR systems, Granstrand (2005) significantly 
labels the phase beginning in the early 1980s as “the pro-patent era”.   
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addressed in terms of "duration", "height" and "breadth" of the patent) that can be derived 
from industrial organization models, are very sensitive to a number of specific 
assumptions concerning the specific set-up of the "patent race". Accordingly, this type of 
literature, at least so far, has not been able to produce a set of unequivocal and clear-cut 
policy prescriptions.
2 Further, one could argue that the majority of these “patent race” 
models rely on over-simplified and unrealistic hypotheses, which tend to misrepresent 
both the nature of innovative processes and the operation of markets for technology 
(Verspagen, 2003; Dosi, Marengo and Pasquali, 2006).
3  
 
Given this state of affairs, some interpreters have been tempted to shed further light on 
such intricate and controversial issues by looking at the historical evidence concerning 
the relationship between patent systems and inventive activities.  Unfortunately, in many 
cases, the appraisal of historical contributions in this field has been rather superficial and 
inaccurate, leading to dangerous misapprehensions of the history lessons (if there are 
any) that could be drawn on the basis of our current knowledge of the industrialization of 
western economies (see Chang, 2001 for a critical discussion of this recent policy 
literature ).  
 
The aim of this paper is to provide a guide to recent research in economic history and 
history of technology, dealing with the connection between the patent system and 
inventive activities in the early phases of modern economic growth of Western 
economies.
4 In particular, we will focus on the British and US experience. The choice of 
Britain is motivated by the fact that it is of obvious interest to consider the role that the 
patent system played in the "making" of the “first industrial nation”. By contrast, the US 
                                                 
2 As noted iconoclastically by David (1993, p. 43), the current state of the art in the industrial organization 
approach to patents does not allow us to revise the well-known inconclusive assessments made by Penrose 
and Machlup during the 1950s: “If national patent did not exist, it would be difficult to make a conclusive 
case for introducing them; but the fact that they do exist shifts the burden of the proof and it is equally 
difficult to make a conclusive case for abolishing them” (Penrose, 1951, p. 40 ). See also Machlup (1958, p. 
79-80).      
3 See Winter (1993) and Vallee and Yldizoglu (2006) for two studies of the relationship between patents 
and the pace of innovation based on evolutionary models that take explicitly on board the issue of the 
bounded rationality of the agents. Interestingly enough, both studies suggest that regimes of weak patent 
protection may yield faster rates of technical change.   
4 For a general overview of the long-run evolution of Intellectual Property Rights, we refer the reader to 
May and Sell (2006). 
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case has been selected, as representative of the country that first adopted what may be 
considered a truly modern patent system. As we shall see, in both cases, the historical 
record does not lend itself to straightforward and clear-cut interpretations. However, on 
the basis of the studies carried out over the last twenty years, it is possible to work out 
some cautionary notes on the centrality of a "strong" patent regime for a global economic 
development strategy.   
 
2. Patent systems and industrialization: Britain  
Rather surprisingly, the role of the patent system in the early phases of British 
industrialization did not become a subject of systematic historical investigation until the 
mid 1980s.  Before that, the theme had been frequently touched upon in most of the 
works of synthesis providing general appraisals of the origins and nature of the 
industrialization of western economies. However, these judgments were based on the 
evaluation  of the anecdotal experience of a handful of great inventors, such as Watt, 
Arkwright, and Crompton. Against this background, it should not come as a surprise that 
assessments of the patent system could be very different. Let us just consider two of the 
most authoritative works of synthesis on industrialization. North and Thomas (1973) gave 
the emergence and the progressive operationalization of the patent system a prominent 
place in their explanation of the rise of Britain as the “first industrial nation”:
5  
 
Innovation will be encouraged by modifying the institutional environment, so that the private rate of return 
approaches the social rate of return. Prizes and awards provide incentives for specific inventions, but do not 
provide a legal basis for ownership of intellectual property. The development of patent laws provides such 
protection....[B]y 1700...England had begun to protect private property in knowledge with its patent law. 
The stage was now set for the industrial revolution (North and Thomas, 1973, pp. 155-156).    
 
In passing, we may note that North and Thomas’ “economic incentive argument” is 
frequently put forward in the contemporary debate by proponents of strong patent 
protection (Chang, 2001).  On the other hand, David Landes remarked that,  
 
                                                 
5 See also North (1981), pp. 164-166.  
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A number of writers have laid stress on the incentive effect of patent legislation. I am inclined to doubt its 
significance (Landes, 1969, p. 64). 
6
 
The first contribution to consider in a systematic way the connection between the patent 
system and inventive activities during the British industrial revolution was Dutton’s 
(1984). The available evidence, according to Dutton, suggests that the British patent 
system, although requiring the completion of cumbersome and costly bureaucratic 
procedures and granting a rather imperfect protection against infringements, was 
nevertheless capable of stimulating inventors’ efforts. His judgment is essentially based 
on a wide-ranging examination of the contemporary literature on inventions, which seems 
to indicate that the prospect of the economic exploitation of a patent was explicitly 
considered by many inventors. Furthermore, Dutton also notices the existence of a group 
of “quasi professional inventors”, that is individuals with several patents who took their 
profits through the sale or licensing of their IP. In Dutton’s view, this suggests that the 
British industrial revolution was characterized by the emergence of a class of individuals 
systematically engaged in inventive activities with a view to reaping their economic fruits 
thanks to patent protection. This group of quasi-professional inventors constituted the 
backbone of an “infant invention industry”. This process was coupled, at least from the 
early nineteenth century, with the emergence of an extensive “trade in invention”. This 
means that patent rights became increasingly the object of market transactions (selling of 
patent rights, licensing, creation of commercial partnerships geared at the exploitation of 
patents). This expanding market for invention, providing a wide range of opportunities 
for the economic exploitation of inventive activities, reinforced the formation of the 
“specialist” invention industry. All in all, Dutton’s conclusion is that the British patent 
system can be seen as having a strong stimulating effect on the rate of invention.  
 
Sullivan (1989) appears to confirm Dutton’s judgment by showing the existence of a 
structural break, in 1757, in the time series of total British patents. According to Sullivan, 
this discontinuity (which is neatly consistent with the traditional chronology of the British 
industrial revolution, ie 1760-1830) reflects an acceleration in the pace of invention 
                                                 
6 In another “classic” reference work on British industrialization, Mathias (1969, p.34) noted that the 
impact of patent laws on innovation "have proved particularly intractable to analyze or to asses" and 
refrained from formulating a final  balance.  
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taking place in the second half of the eighteenth century.
7 At least in part, this 
acceleration is accounted for by the progressive development of a body of case law 
related to the protection and enforcement of the rights of patentees. For example, the 
requirement to specify (normally within two to four months of the patent's enrolment) 
was introduced gradually during the first third of the eighteenth century; from 1734 it 
became standard. Although, initially demanded, it seems, to assist the law officers in 
discriminating between similar inventions, the specification was not normally scrutinized 
by any administrative department of government. As a result, many specifications remain 
vague and opaque  (MacLeod, 1988, pp. 48-55). Increasingly, however, they became 
subjected to a very close examination when a prosecution for infringement reached the 
law courts. This process culminated in Lord Mansfield decision in the case of Liardet vs 
Johnson (1778) which stipulated that the specification should be sufficiently full and 
detailed to enable anyone, skilled in the art or trade to which the invention pertained, to 
understand and apply it without further experiment (MacLeod, 1988, p. 49, and Fisher 
(2003)).  In other words, the time-lag between the enactment of the Statute of Monopolies 
in 1624 (which is commonly regarded as the first British patent law) and the acceleration 
of inventive activities is to be explained by the time needed for firmly establishing the 
rights of the patentees within the framework of the British legal system (Dutton, 1984, 
pp. 73-75;  Sullivan, 1989, p. 435).     
 
Christine MacLeod’s evaluation of the British patent system in the early phases of the 
industrialization process is much more cautious (MacLeod, 1988). She draws attention to 
the frequently heterodox use of patents, which continued until (at least) the late 
eighteenth century. The most typical cases of this behaviour were the use of patents in 
support of specific government concessions and franchises or for advertising/certifying 
                                                 
7 The existence of discontinuity around 1760 was also noted by Bowden (1925, pp. 12-14) and Ashton 
(1948, pp. 118-120).  A recent analysis of the nature of the co-integration between the time series of patents 
and those of industrial output in various sectors for the period (1780-1851) performed by Greasley and 
Oxley (2006) reveals that the causality link run mostly from the dynamics of industrial output in a restricted 
number of key-sectors (cotton, iron and mining) to the series of aggregate patents. In Greasley and Oxley's 
interpretation, this result suggests that the rise of patenting was a consequence and not a cause of the 
acceleration of industrial output growth. A similar view, positing that the acceleration of industrial output 
led to a growth in the demand of patenting, was originally sketched by Ashton (1948). See also MacLeod 
(1988, ch. 8).  
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the specific qualities of a product. Thus, in several industries, and particularly in the 
medical field, patents were often employed as means for constructing product reputation. 
Finally we should also be aware of ‘vanity patenting’, when patents were taken by 
amateur, “gentlemen” inventors, who considered their engagement in scientific and 
technological activities as an enjoyable diversion. For these men, the granting of a patent 
was just a means for achieving a general public recognition for their inventive efforts, 
rather than the basis for the economic exploitation of a specific invention. Furthermore, 
MacLeod also notices that a large volume of inventive activities was undertaken outside 
the coverage of the patent system.
8 Broadly speaking, in the course of the eighteenth 
century the coverage of the patent system remained highly  restricted both sectorally 
(limited to the newly emerging capital-intensive sectors)
 9  and to commercially dynamic 
urban areas (chiefly, London, Birmingham, Bristol and Manchester). It would be wrong 
to assume that this concentration reflected the higher inventive activitiy of these sectors 
or locations, since emergent capitalism in their manufacturing industries probably 
increased their propensity to patent. In the period we are considering, particularly 
innovative and technologically sophisticated industries such as machine tools, mining and 
metallurgy, branches of chemicals, etc. remained characterized by a persistently low 
propensity to patent (MacLeod, 1988, ch. 6). 
 
The foregoing discussion shows that the study of the role of the patent system is vitiated 
by the difficulties which are inherent in using patents as output indicators of inventive 
activities. The limitations of patent counts have been starkly summarized by Griliches 
(1990, p. 1669): "Not all inventions are patentable, not all inventions are patented and the 
inventions that are patented differ greatly in 'quality'...".  This means that a proper 
                                                 
8 Petra Moser (2005) research on the inventions presented at the Crystal Palace exhibition of 1851 provides 
an interesting snapshot on the large volume of inventive activities undertaken outside the patent systems in 
the first half of the nineteenth century. None of the British or American industries she considers had 
patenting rates (ie, the ratio between patented inventions and total inventions) higher than 50%. The highest 
value reported by Moser is 36.4% for the US machinery industry. Remarkably, differences in patenting 
rates across industries were similar in the US and Britain (countries that in 1851 were characterized by very 
different patent laws). This finding suggests that one of the major determinants of the patenting decisions of 
inventors lay in the differences in the technological characteristics of the innovations across industries 
(Moser, 2006).  
9 Sullivan (1990) has instead considered patenting activities in the period 1711-1850 as remarkably 
widespread across all economic sectors. In our view, a careful assessment of the very same data he sets out, 
reveals that patenting was instead heavily concentrated in a few key-sectors.  
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assessment of the links between patent laws and inventive activities requires to move 
beyond simple "patent counting", and provide an evaluation not only of the volume of 
inventive activities undertaken outside the coverage of patent protection, but also of the 
actual technological significance of patented inventions. 
10
 
In this sense, detailed examinations of the contents of patents for specific industries may 
provide us with important insights.
  11 An exercise along these lines has been recently 
carried out by MacLeod et. al. (2003). They examined in detail a sample of 2,009  British 
patents in steam engineering, for the period 1800-1900, and found that 365 of these 
patents (corresponding to a sizable 18.1%) were granted to “perpetual motion” machines 
or other inventions which were not technically feasible. Interestingly enough, 217 of 
these impossible patents were granted in the period 1860-1900, that is well after the 
formulation of the principles of classic thermodynamics by Clausius and Kelvin in the 
early 1850s, which scientifically proved the impossibility of a perpetual motion engine.
12  
 
To sum up, historical research on the British case, seems to suggest that, at least to a 
degree, the patent system had a positive effect on inventive activities. This judgment is 
essentially substantiated by Dutton’s group of “quasi-professional” inventors.   
Notwithstanding this, given the amount of evidence pointing to the significance of non-
patented technological progress, the relative contribution provided by the patent system 
to the general volume of inventive activities in this historical phase, remains a matter 
open for judgment. Furthermore, in our assessment, we should also not forget the 
detrimental impact on the rate of innovation of “blocking patents”:Scherer (1965) and 
Kanefsky (1978) considerthe negative impact of Watt ‘s separate condenser patent on 
innovation in steam engineering). In this respect, in the mid nineteenth century concerns 
                                                 
10 In 1869, US Commissioner of Patents, Samuel S. Sparks suggested that only 10 per cent of all patents 
granted had some commercial value (Basalla, 1988, p.69).   
11 Other contributions (see Sullivan (1994) and Inkster (2003)), following the example of Shankerman and 
Pakes (1986), have instead made use of patent renewal data for assessing the relative value of patents 
during the nineteenth century.  
12 The findings of Macleod et al. (2003) also suggest a cautionary attitude towards the use of renewal data. 
In their study they find that many potentially valuable steam engineering patents were not renewed (this 
was most probably due to the limited financial resources of many patent holders). Vice versa, even some 
technically impossible inventions were kept in force for the full patent duration.  
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over the detrimental impact of “frivolous” patents (i.e. patents that were chiefly taken to 
harass manufacturers with preposterous demands for royalty payments  under the threat 
of prosecution for infringements)  on inventive activities were so serious, that, in 1851, 
several of the expert witnesses (including I.K. Brunel) called in front of the Select 
Committee of the House of Lords on the reform of patent laws had no hesitations in 
proposing the complete abolition of the patent system in order to avoid the problem 
(House of Lords, 1851).
13  
 
3. Patents systems and industrialization: the USA 
It must be recognized that the first patent system working by what we might consider 
truly modern procedures was not the British, but the American, especially after the Patent 
reform of 1836 (Khan and Sokoloff, 2001).
14 Until the reform of 1852, the British patent 
system was characterized by a very restricted accessibility, due mostly to the high costs 
and the cumbersome administrative procedures involved in the process (Khan, 2005, p. 
31).
15 On the other hand, in the United States, the patent application process was 
relatively smooth, involving few straightforward administrative procedures. The US 
patent fee was $30. For this reason, one could argue that the validity of North and 
Thomas’ hypothesis, linking the acceleration in the rate of innovation and the emergence 
of patent institutions, ought to be examined primarily in the case of the United States.  
 
In a number of recent papers Sokoloff, Lamoreaux and Khan have tackled exactly this 
issue, examining the relationship between the patent system and inventive activities in the 
United States during the nineteenth century (see Khan and Sokoloff, 2001 for a general 
                                                 
13 For an account of the patent controversy in Victorian Britain, see MacLeod (1996). On the views of 
Brunel concerning the negative impact of the patent system on the rate of innovation, see Buchanan (2002, 
pp.177-178) and Miller (2006).  
14 The patent reform of 1836 officially introduced the procedure of examination. It is also worth noting that, 
until 1836, the US denied patent protection to foreign applicants (Khan, 2005, p.57). Thus, although, the 
US patent system did not protect explicitly the “piracy” and “transfer” of foreign technologies, in several 
instances (in particular in the case of textile technologies) it was effectively employed for such purposes. 
This was typically done by patenting marginal improvements of European inventions. For a detailed case-
study of the attempt of transferring Arkwright’s water-frame in the US using the coverage of a US patent, 
see  Wallace and Jeremy (1977).   
15 The sensitivity of British patenting to fees was clearly shown in 1852, when the initial fee for a UK 
patent was reduced from approximately £350 (corresponding to $1,680, see Khan (2005, p.31)) to £25 and 
the number of patents leapt from 455 issued in 1851 to 2,187 in 1853; following a further reduction to £4 in 
1883 the annual total of patents almost trebled from 5,993 in 1883 to 17,100 in 1884.  
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overview). Their contributions are based on an extensive quantitative analysis of the 
evidence collected from the patent records. 
 
Sokoloff (1988) considers the patterns of patenting in the US over the period 1790-1846. 
Over time, patenting exhibits a cyclical behaviour around an upward trend which mirrors 
that of the major economic fluctuations. Geographically, patenting exhibits the tendency 
to cluster in areas located in the proximity of  navigable waterways (which provided low 
cost access to major markets) and in urban centres. These results, in Sokoloff’s 
interpretation, suggest that patents and inventive activities were, in general, highly 
responsive to the expansion of markets. This influence of "market pulling" factors on 
patenting, in Sokoloff and Khan's view, indicates a general responsiveness "of inventive 
activity....to material incentives, as well as to the availability and security of property 
rights in technology" (Khan and Sokoloff, 2001, p. 240).  
 
 
In a related contribution, Khan and Sokoloff (1990) examine the issue of the 
responsiveness of individual inventors to the economic inducements granted by the patent 
system over the period 1790-1846. They conclude that American inventors sought 
consistently to secure patent rights for their inventions and that patent protection 
permitted a fairly effective appropriation of economic returns stemming from inventive 
activities. 
 
Khan and Sokoloff (1998) have compared the British and American patent systems. 
Undoubtedly, the British patent system before the 1852 reform was far less effective than 
the American in protecting the intellectual property rights of the patentee. Furthermore, 
as we have seen, administrative and monetary costs were considerably higher in Britain 
than in the United States, and this restrained access to the system. By the 1810s, the US 
surpassed Britain in patenting per capita, and it would remain higher in the US 
throughout the nineteenth century (Khan and Sokoloff, 2001, p. 238-239). This evidence, 
according to Khan and Sokoloff suggests that the rate of innovation was probably lower 
in early industrial Britain than in the United States. Obviously, this assessment is based 
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on the assumption that patenting per capita reflects the relative volume of inventive 
activity. However, as Mokyr (2002, p. 295) has aptly remarked, the analysis of Sokoloff 
and his associates, does not appear consistent with the traditional view of economic 
historians and historians of technology, who have regarded the period 1790-1850 as a 
phase of firmly established  British technological leadership. 
16   
  
In other contributions, using data on the licensing and assigning behaviour of a large 
number of patentees, Lamoreax and Sokoloff (1996, 1999a, 1999b, 2001) argue that in 
the United States, during the nineteenth century, a solid market for technical innovations 
structured around the institution of the patent system progressively emerged. Through 
this well functioning “market for technology”, individual inventors were able to sell to 
firms the new technical knowledge they had discovered. In the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the growth and consolidation of this market was also favoured by the 
emergence of a specialized class of intermediaries (patent agents and solicitors) which 
were able to “match” buyers and sellers in this market for patent rights, thereby lowering 
transaction costs substantially (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 2002). The existence of this 
type of market promoted a fruitful division of labour with “technologically creative 
individuals” (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 1999b, p.3) specializing in inventive activities, 
and firms in the production and commercialisation phases.
17 Hence, the coupled 
                                                 
16 In this sense, the interpretation of Sokoloff and his associates is consistent with recent research 
contending that traditional accounts of industrialization may be in need of some revision with the United 
States "overtaking" Britain in an earlier period. For example, according to the recent estimates of 
Broadberry and Irwin (2006), the United States attained a substantial lead in labour productivity in industry 
over Britain as early as 1840. For a thorough discussion  of the technology gap between Britain and the 
United States in the first half of the nineteenth century from the point of view of the history of technology 
arguing in favour of a British lead - especially in mechanical engineering -  until about 1850s, see Musson 
(1981).       
17 More specifically, Sokoloff, Lamoreaux and Khan distinguish two phases characterizing the historical 
evolution of nineteenth century inventive activities in the United States (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 1996, 
pp. 12686-12687). The first phase covers approximately the period, 1790-1846. In this period, inventive 
activities are widely widespread across the entire population (“democratization of invention”). The rather 
simple nature of technology permitted ordinary citizens with common skills to be engaged in inventive 
activities. The second phase covers the period 1840-1920. In this period (due to the spread of 
mechanization and the increasing complexity of technology) inventions were primarily produced by 
individuals with technical backgrounds who were strongly committed to inventive activities. The market 
for technology reinforced this process of specialization.  
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development of the patent system and the market for technology determined a steady 
acceleration in the rate of innovation. 
18
  
An interesting example of the operation of this market for technology is provided in 
Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (2000), where they consider the case of the American glass 
industry. In this case too, they find evidence of the existence of a well-established market 
for technology operating through two channels: first, specialized trade journals 
disseminating general information and providing detailed descriptions of patent 
specifications; secondly, specialized patent agents who were able to act as intermediaries 
in the sale of patented technologies. In the same study, Lamoreaux and Sokoloff also 
notice that a number of locations with high patenting activities (in glass) were 
characterized by little glass production. In their view, this finding indicates that “learning 
by doing” and “localized knowledge spillovers” (two factors that have been prominently 
put forward to explain the connection between the localization of production and 
innovation) played a relatively minor role in the technological development of the 
industry. Geographical clusters of patenting in the American glass industry are instead 
accounted for by the existence of a more developed market for technology in those areas. 
Although Lamoreaux and Sokoloff acknowledge that it is hard to draw robust 
generalizations, they contend that, by combining the evidence of the glass industry with 
their findings for the economy as a whole, the proposition that the development of the 
patent system produced a tidy and fruitful division of labour between innovation and 
production appears to be confirmed.  
 
As should be clear from this concise summary of their contributions, Lamoreaux, 
Sokoloff and Khan have elaborated a complex account of technical change in the course 
of US industrialization, which is in many respects similar to the one originally proposed 
for Britain by Dutton. It is worth stressing again that their interpretation, more or less 
explicitly, downplays the role of learning by doing and of knowledge spillovers in 
nineteenth-century technical advances.  
                                                 
18 For an extensive treatment of the relationship between markets for technologies and the division of 
innovative labour, see Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella (2001). The research findings of Lamoreaux, 
Sokoloff and Khan are discussed on pp. 23-27.  
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4. The “Great inventors” approach  
The contributions of Sokoloff, Khan and Lamoreaux that we have discussed so far are 
based on the systematic analysis of patent records. In several instances, their analysis of 
the connection between the patent system and inventive activities, relies  on patent counts 
as a synthetic indicator of the volume of inventive activities.
19 Recognizing the general 
limitations of this type of inquiry, Khan and Sokoloff have tried to provide additional 
evidence on the nature and scope of inventive activities, by means of what may be 
labeled the “great inventors approach" (Khan and Sokoloff, 1993, Khan and Sokoloff, 
2004, see also Khan, 2005, ch. 7).   
 
In a nutshell, the great inventor approach consists in a prosopographical investigation
20  
of American “great inventors” active in the period 1790-1930.  
Khan and Sokoloff’s sample is drawn from a number of American biographical 
dictionaries, by identifying all the individuals to whom at least one major invention was 
ascribed.
21  Their systematic investigation of this sample of “great inventors” shows that 
these inventors typically engaged in inventive activities with a view to explicitly reaping 
economic returns by means of patents. In general, throughout their lives, they tended to 
obtain a number of diverse patents and to employ the whole range of options allowed by 
their patent holding  (direct production, assignment or sale of patent rights, licensing) for 
appropriating the economic returns of their inventive activities. Overall, it would appear 
that there was no fundamental distinction between the behaviour of the “great inventors” 
and that of the much larger population of US patentees: the inventive activities of both 
groups were very similar in terms of their general responsiveness to market inducements. 
Indeed, what distinguished the “great inventors” was their “entrepreneurial abilities”. 
                                                 
19 Sokoloff (1992) finds a positive significant link between total factor productivity and the number of 
patents per capita by US county over the period 1820-1860, which he interprets as providing support to the 
use of nineteenth-century US patent counts as good indicators of the volume of inventive activities.  For a 
critical assessment of this exercise, see Atack (1992).      
20 Prosopography is a technical term which in historical scholarship indicates the study of the common 
background characteristics of a selected group of individuals. 
21 Khan and Sokoloff 's samples of US inventors comprise 160 individuals for the period 1790-1865 and 
409 individuals (408 men and one woman) for the period 1790-1930: see respectively Khan and Sokoloff 
(1993) and  Khan and Sokoloff (2004). 
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They were actually more, not less, finely attuned than the average patentee to economic 
incentives.  
Khan and Sokoloff’s conclusion is that their “great inventors” prosopography has 
provided a synthetic, but accurate, record of the major contours of inventive activity 
during the nineteenth century, which corroborates the evidence from the patent records 
(Khan and Sokoloff, 2001).  
 
MacLeod and Nuvolari (2006) have recently raised concerns over the “great inventors”  
exercise.  The critical issue is that Khan and Sokoloff treat the selection of their “great 
inventors” as unproblematic. They state only that, “The sample comprises virtually all the 
best-known antebellum inventors who were first active in the field of innovation between 
1790 and 1846”. Their “main source . . . was volumes 1 to 10 of the Dictionary of 
American Biography. This was supplemented by Who Was Who in America, Historical 
Volume, 1607-1896 and The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography; additional 
details were obtained from a number of biographical sources.”(Khan and Sokoloff, 1993, 
p. 290).  On reflection, it is clear that the use of these iconic works of collective 
biography is unlikely to provide a random or representative sample of inventors. 
Consequently, a detailed inquiry into the criteria governing the selection of entries in 
such historical reference works should be a compulsory research step in this type of 
exercises. MacLeod and Nuvolari (2006) investigate in detail this issue, by considering 
the representation of inventive activities during the British industrial revolution in the 
first edition of the Dictionary of National Biography (DNB) (1885-1900). They construct 
a sample of “great” British inventors, following a methodology similar to the one adopted 
by Khan and Sokoloff (i.e. they select all individuals alive in the period 1650-1850, who 
are credited with at least one invention in their DNB entry). The analysis of the inventive 
activities of the 383 “great” British inventors identified by MacLeod and Nuvolari 
suggests the existence in the DNB  of a strong bias towards inventors active in very 
specific technological fields, such as steam engineering, navigation, railways, etc. 
(mostly those associated with the grand narrative of the British industrial revolution and 
imperial advance). Other technologies and industries, such as consumption goods, food 
and drink production, etc., that recent historical scholarship has shown to be of great 
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economic and technological significance (see Bruland, 2004) did not receive adequate 
attention by the compilers of the DNB.  In broader terms, this raises doubts concerning 
the interpretation that Khan and Sokoloff would like to attach to “great” inventors’ 
evidence.  MacLeod and Nuvolari’s  conclusion is that, when used as a source in the field 
of history of technology,  biographical dictionaries might actually reveal more about the 
lenses through which scholars and contemporaries have looked at and judged specific 
inventions or technologies, rather than about the actual contours of technical progress in a 
specific historical period. 
22
 
5. The significance of collective invention 
Following the seminal contribution of Bob Allen, recent research is increasingly drawing 
attention to the critical importance of collective invention settings as critical institutional 
support for inventive activities during the early phases of industrialization (Allen, 1983). 
In collective invention settings, competing firms freely release to one another pertinent 
technical information on the construction details and the performance of the technologies 
they have just introduced.
23 Allen has noticed this type of behaviour in the iron industry 
of Cleveland (UK) over the period 1850-1875. In the Cleveland district, iron producers 
freely disclosed to their competitors technical information concerning the construction 
details and the performance of the blast furnaces they had erected. In the words of Allen,  
 
....if a firm constructed a new plant[more specifically, a blast furnace] of novel design and that plant proved 
to have lower costs than other plants, these facts were made available to other firms in the industry and to 
potential entrants. The next firm constructing a new plant built on the experience of the first by introducing 
and extending the design change that had proved profitable. The operating characteristics of the second 
plant would then also be made available to potential investors. In this way fruitful lines of technical 
advance were identified and pursued (Allen, 1983, p.2). 
 
Information was normally released through both formal channels (presentations at 
meetings of engineering societies and publications of design details in technical journals) 
                                                 
22 MacLeod and Nuvolari (2006) find that more than 39% of their sample of "great" British inventors 
extracted from the Dictionary of National Biography never took a patent. Thus, in case one is not troubled 
by the limitations of this type of source, this finding provides another indication of the large volume of 
inventive activity taking place outside the coverage of the patent system during the early phases of British 
industrialization.    
23 There is an interesting historical parallel between nineteenth century collective invention and 
contemporary open source software development (see Nuvolari, 2005 for a further elaboration).  
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and informal ones (such as visits to plants, conversations, etc.). Additionally, new 
technical knowledge was usually not protected by patents, so that competing firms could 
liberally make use of the released information when they came to erect a new plant.
 24 As 
a consequence of the proliferation of these “voluntary” knowledge spillovers, in the 
period considered, the height of the furnaces and the blast temperature increased steadily 
by means of a series of small but continuous rises. Increases in furnace height and in the 
blast temperature brought about lower fuel consumption and lower production costs.  On 
the basis of his findings,  Allen suggests that the pattern of technical change emerging 
from collective invention settings is dominated by incremental innovations. 
 
Another important case of nineteenth century collective invention has been identified by 
Nuvolari (2004). In this case, the technology developed collectively was the steam 
pumping engines which were used for draining Cornish copper and tin mines.  In the 
wake of their disappointing experience with Watt’s patent for the separate condenser (its 
tight enforcement having led to a stagnation of inventive activities during the 1780s and 
1790s), Cornish steam engineers typically preferred not take a patent for their inventions. 
Accordingly, the share of patents in steam engineering for the period 1813-1852 fell to 
under one per cent of the national total of all patents.
25 Yet, in the same period, Cornwall 
assumed the technological  leadership of British steam engineering, with the introduction 
and development of the high-pressure engines. It is also important to note that in 1812 
Cornish mining engineers and entrepreneurs launched a monthly journal called Lean’s 
Engine Reporter with the explicit intention of facilitating the discovery and rapid 
dissemination of best-practice techniques.  
 
                                                 
24 Note that Allen’s notion of “collective invention” does not refer to the exchange of information between 
users and producers studied by Lundvall (1988). In fact, Allen is describing an exchange of information 
among competing entities. “Collective invention” also differs from  “know-how trading” described by von 
Hippel (1987). In “know-how trading”, engineers “trade” proprietary know-how in the sense the 
information is exchanged on a bilateral basis (non-participants to the transaction in question are excluded).  
Within collective invention, all the competing firms of the industry have  free access to the potentially 
proprietary know-how, see von Hippel (1987), pp. 296-297. Cowan and Jonard (2003) have recently 
proposed a model which analyzes the properties  of  knowledge diffusion in collective invention settings.  
25 In the period 1698-1812, Cornwall's share in the national total was about 10 per cent, which was the 
second highest share , after London, see Nuvolari (2004, p. 358).   
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As with the Cleveland blast furnaces described by Allen, the emergence of a collective 
invention regime was favoured by a specific set of conditions. First, the “empirical”   
nature of inventive activities (in this period there was no established theory of the 
functioning of the steam engine) made it particularly fruitful to extrapolate the best 
design options from the systematic collection and analysis of information concerning 
variation in the design and  performance of a large number of engines. Secondly, the 
structure of the Cornish mining industry (where mine entrepreneurs usually held shares in 
several different mines) favoured the search for improvements in the average 
performance of pumping engines (the rapid dissemination of best-practice techniques was 
clearly the most direct way for raising average performance). At the same time, the 
systematic publication of the performance of the engines allowed the best engineers to 
demonstrate their engineering skills and improve their professional reputations and career 
prospects.     
 
Although not as systematic as in the "collective invention settings" identified in Cornwall 
and Cleveland, a similar ethos seems to have pervaded the nascent civil engineering 
profession, which was responsible for many of the innovations in transport that we 
commonly identify with the industrial revolution. Very little of the problem-solving 
activity that underpinned the engineering of bridges, tunnels, cuttings, embankments, 
etc.-- whether for roads, canals or railways-is reflected in the patent records. Rather, civil 
engineers tended to share and publish their solutions, with a view to enhancing their 
professional reputations (MacLeod, 1988, pp. 104-5). An analogous disregard for the 
privatisation of intellectual property is also discernible among other innovative groups of 
this period, such as some of the early developers of machine tools (others members of 
this group, however, practised secrecy) and the first generation of West Riding textile 
engineers (Cookson, 1997, pp. 8-9)  
   
It would be wrong to assume that collective invention was just a British phenomenon. In 
his account of the development of the high pressure engine for the western steamboats in 
the United States, during the early nineteenth century, Louis Hunter has also emphasized 
the significance of various flows of incremental innovations (Hunter, 1949, pp. 121-180). 
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In the light of the present discussion this passage from Hunter’s contribution is 
particularly intriguing:  
 
Though the men who developed the machinery of the western steamboat possessed much ingenuity and 
inventive skill, the record shows that they had little awareness of or use for the patent system. Of more than 
six hundreds patents relating to steam engines issued in this country down to 1847 only some forty were 
taken out in the names of men living in towns and cities of the western rivers. Few even of this small 
number had any practical significance. In view of the marked western preference for steam over water 
power and the extensive development of steam-engine manufacturing in the West, these are surprising 
figures. How is this meager showing to be explained and interpreted ? Does it reflect a distaste for patents 
as a species of monopoly uncongenial to the democratic ways of the West, an attitude sharpened by the 
attempts of Fulton and Evans to collect royalties from steamboatmen ? Or, were western mechanics so 
accustomed to think in terms of mere utility that they failed to grasp the exploitative possibilities of the 
products of their ingenuity ? Or, did mechanical innovation in this field proceed by such small increments 
as to present few points which could readily be seized upon by a potential patentee ? Perhaps each of these 
suggestions – and especially the last - holds a measure of the truth. At all events the fact remains that, so far 
as can be determined, no significant part of the engine, propelling mechanism, or boilers during the period 
of the steamboat’s development to maturity was claimed and patented as a distinctive and original 
development (Hunter, 1949, pp. 175-176).  
 
 
This passage seems clearly to reveal the existence of another collective invention setting 
in early nineteenth-century steam engineering. Interestingly enough, Hunter suggests that 
the litigation of the patents taken by Robert Fulton and Oliver Evans (mirroring the 
conflict between Boulton and Watt and Cornish engineers) may help account for the 
negative attitude of western mechanics towards patents (see Hunter, 1949, p. 10 and pp. 
124-126 for a short overview of these litigation cases). Again, the dynamics of 
technological change in western steamboats was characterized by the steady 
accumulation of many minor changes and alterations  to the design of the physical 
characteristics of the steaming, which determined improvements in carrying capacity, 
increases of speed, reduction of cargo collection times, etc. The cumulative impact of 
these improvements led to a rate of productivity growth which was without parallel in the 
transport technology of the period (Mak and Walton, 1972). 
26 The  detailed study of 
paper-making in Berkshire (US) by McGaw (1987) seems also to point to the existence of 
                                                 
26 “The available evidence suggests that the increase of steamboat productivity (on inland rivers), 1815-
1860, exceeded that of any other major transportation medium for a period of similar length in the 
nineteenth century” (Mak and Walton, 1972, p.623).   
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another American collective invention setting.
27 Finally, Foray and Hilaire-Perez (2006) 
suggest that it also characterized the highly successful silk industry of Lyon.  
 
As a final consideration, it is important not to dismiss these cases of collective invention 
as "curious exceptions". It is worth stressing, once more,  that key-technologies that  lay 
at the heart of the industrialization process, such as high pressure steam engines, 
steamboats, iron production techniques, etc. were at times developed in a collective 
invention fashion, and consequently outside the coverage of the patent system.    
 
6. Other institutional arrangements supporting inventive activities.  
David (1993) has suggested that, in capitalist economies, the institutional arrangements 
supporting inventive activities may be summarized in terms of three P’s, namely Property 
Rights (or patents), Patronage and Procurement. In this respect, our recognition of the 
historical literature suggests that, so far, historical research has focused primarily on the 
patent system. We believe that is important that historians in their future research efforts 
devote attention also to the other two P’s. Here we will limit ourselves to some 
considerations which suggest that these alternative institutional arrangements to patent 
protection may have played an important role in supporting inventive activities in specific 
technological fields in the early phases of industrialization.  
Let us consider first the case of public procurement, The famous block-making 
machinery (a complex of machines which permitted the full mechanization of the 
production of pulley-blocks for the Royal Navy ships) was developed by Marc Brunel 
and Henry Maudslay at the Portsmouth Dockyards, following a contract of public 
procurement with the Admiralty (Rolt, 1957, pp. 32-33 and Coad, 2005). Another famous 
case of successful public support for the development of a specific invention, is the 
"Congreve" rocket which was developed at the Royal Arsenal in Woolwich by William 
Congreve (Stearn, 2004).  
 
                                                 
27 The interpretation of the McGaw study as another possible case of collective invention in the sense of 
Allen has been first suggested by Cowan and Jonard (2003).  
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In some cases, procurement for certain technological advances was implemented by 
means of prizes and competitions.
28 Perhaps one of the most successful cases of this form 
of public procurement is the Longitude Act of 1714. The Act established a handsome 
prize of £ 20,000 for a method for determining the longitude (which was one of the most 
taxing problems of oceanic navigation). The prize was finally assigned in 1775 to John 
Harrison for his "perfect clock" after a prolonged struggle. Be this as it may, Harrison's 
clock is nowadays recognized as one of the most fundamental breakthroughs in marine 
instrumentation (King, 2004).  
Paul David ‘s contributions (see, e.g., David, 2004) have made clear that public patronage 
became, from the sixteenth century onwards, the most important form  of support of 
“scientific” research. However, it should be recognized that during the eighteenth and the 
nineteenth century, some forms of public patronage also covered technological activities.  
For example, we can surely consider in this light the public support provided by the 
Treasury to Charles Babbage’s pioneering efforts to construct a mechanical calculating 
engine, although evidently the project cannot be regarded as fully crowned with success 
(Swade, 2004). 
29     
Another important case of effective patronage of invention has been identified by 
Griffiths, Hunt and O'Brien (1992) and Hilaire-Perez (2000, pp. 190-209) in the Royal 
Society of Arts. In the second half of the eighteenth century the Society promoted 
inventive activities in a wide range of industries by means of prizes. It should be noted, 
that, in the interest of dissemination, the Society would have not normally assigned a 
prize to an invention which was patented. Griffiths, Hunt and O'Brien (1992) find that a 
large volume of inventive activities in the textile industries can be linked directly with the 
prize competitions of the Society. 
30 We should also not forget that, in some special 
                                                 
28 According to Boehm and Silberston (1967, pp. 25-26) from 1750 to 1825 there were at least eight Acts of 
Parliament instituting various forms of rewards for specific type of inventions (most of them in the field of 
navigation instruments)  
29 Another example of a risky (and ultimately unsuccessful) technological project that received financial 
backing (a grant of £200) from the Admiralty is the “gaz engine” of Marc and I.K. Brunel, see Buchanan 
(2002, pp. 20-22).  
30 In France, direct public patronage and procurement of invention was much stronger than in Britain 
(Hilaire-Perez, 2002).   
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cases, Parliament also established rewards for inventors “post-facto”.
31 It was calculated 
that by 1815 more than £77,000 had been distributed in this form (Bohem and Silberston, 
1967, p. 26).      
 
7. Directions for further research  
As this survey of recent contributions has shown, considerable progress has been made in 
the analysis of the role played by patent systems during the early phases of 
industrialization. However, it is also clear that important issues are still in need of further 
investigation. In this section, we would like to flag up what seem to us to be the most 
fruitful directions for further research.  
 
a)  It is vital to connect research on the emergence of patent systems with recent 
research on the nature of inventive activities in the pre-industrial revolution 
Western societies (1500-1750). In this respect, Epstein (1998) has taken a 
revisionist stance and argued that, contrary to the traditional view, some features 
of the guild system may have represented an effective mean for encouraging both 
invention and diffusion in a context where technological knowledge was chiefly 
tacit and empirical and costs of transmission were high (see, however, Ogilive 
(2005) for some cautionary notes on this argument). Similarly, Belfanti (2004) 
argues that early patents and guilds were two instruments of technology policy 
which were used consciously in tandem by mercantilist states during the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries. These perspectives open the possibility of shedding 
new light on the processes of transformation/adaptation undergone by patents 
(changing their nature from an instrument for stimulating technology transfer to a 
device for encouraging domestic innovation) during the early phases of 
industrialization  (David, 1993).  In this respect, the recent contributions of 
Epstein and Belfanti suggest that this transition was an element of a broader 
process of historical change which involved other forms of IPRs and a 
                                                 
31 Recipients of this type of reward comprise: Samuel Cromton, inventor of the spinning mule and Edward 
Jenner, inventor of the smallpox vaccine, Edmund Cartwright, inventor of the power-loom, and  Henry and 
Sealy Fourdrinier, importers of the paper-making machine. 
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concomitant  of re-definition of the notions of authorship, invention and 
creativity.
32 
b)  Increasing  attention should be paid to the role of invention conducted outside the 
coverage of patent protection. This involves making further progress with the 
collective invention research agenda (identification of other circumstances in 
which the phenomenon took place and analysis of the various sets of conditions 
which led to its emergence and disappearance in different historical 
circumstances).  We also need, however, to go beyond that. As noted by Nelson 
(1992), in every industry there is always a component of technological change 
which is publicly shared. From this perspective, collective invention processes 
can be seen as representing one extreme of a much wider spectrum. Hence it is 
important to study and compare in detail the patterns of patented and  unpatented 
inventive activities in a variety of industrial contexts.  
c)  It is also important to combine the use of patents as indicators of inventive 
activities, with indicators constructed on the basis of other historical sources. The 
work of Petra Moser (2005, 2006) has shown the potentialities of the ingenious 
use of exhibition data. For many industries, there is a rich contemporary 
engineering literature which could be used for constructing lists of inventions 
(covering both patented and non-patented ones) and also for an assessment of 
their technological and economic significance. 
33 
 
8. Concluding remarks.  
Our survey of historical research suggest that accounts of industrialization that are based 
on simple and general causal mechanisms linking the emergence of patent systems and 
markets for technology with an acceleration of inventive activities may be unwarranted. 
Following Mokyr (2002), it might be assumed that the origins of western industrialization 
                                                 
32 See Biagioli (2006) for a challenging account of the changing use of patents for protecting invention in 
scientific instruments  in the early-modern period.    
33 Schmookler (1966) made use of lists of “important inventions”. Of course, depending on the nature of 
the historical sources employed, these lists have various pitfalls, the most prominent is clearly their 
somewhat “subjective” character. Still, if properly handled, we believe that they may represent a useful 
complement to patent data. It is also worth remarking, that several key-insights into the nature of modern 
innovative processes elaborated during the 1970s and 1980s -  for example Pavitt’s taxonomy (Pavitt, 
1984) were based on the analysis of this type of data.   
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lay in a revolution in the procedures for the accumulation and dissemination of 'useful 
knowledge' taking place in the eighteenth and in the early nineteenth century. However, it 
would be wrong to assume that the emergence of patent systems played a critical or 
determinant role in such a transition. The evidence discussed in this paper has shown that 
the institutional arrangements supporting inventive activities in this historical phase were 
extremely variegated and sophisticated. Further, a large volume of inventive activities 
was undertaken outside the coverage of patent protection. It is worth remarking once 
more that this type of inventive activity provided a fundamental contribution to the 
development of some of the key-technologies of early industrialization. In other words, 
the roots of western industrialization seem to have been wider and deeper than the 
emergence of modern patent systems. When the  recent debate on IPR and economic 
development is considered in this light, one cannot avoid the impression that excessive 
emphasis has been put on the implementation of strong IPR regimes and that a more 
sobering and pragmatic approach to innovation policies is in order. 
34
                                                 
34 Even Khan,  who sees a potential role for a strengthening of patent protection in developing countries in 
enhancing the opportunities of relative disadvantaged individuals (Khan, 2005, p. 314) is extremely 
cautious on the issue of global harmonization towards higher standards of IPR protection: "[The]...analysis 
of the evolution of intellectual property regimes in Europe and in the United States raises questions about 
the desirability of applying the same system to all places at all times. Indeed, the major lesson that one 
derives from this aspect of the economic history of Europe and America is that intellectual property rights 
best promoted the progress of science and arts when the evolved in tandem with other institutions and in 
accordance with the needs and interests of social and economic development in each nation. In short, the 
historical record suggests that appropriate policies towards intellectual property are not independent of the 
level of development nor of the overall institutional environment" (Khan, 2002, p. 58).  
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